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Abstract
Duality of linear programming is a standard approach to the classical weightedmaximum
matching problem. From an economic perspective, the dual variables can be regarded as
prices of products and payoffs of buyers in a two-sidedmatching market. Traditional duality-
based algorithms, e.g., Hungarian, essentially aims at finding a set of prices that clears the
market. Under suchmarket-clearingprices, a maximummatching is formedwhen buyers buy
their most preferred products respectively. We study the property of market-clearing prices
without the use of duality, showing that: (1) the space of market-clearing prices is convex
and closed under element-wise maximum and minimum operations; (2) any market-clearing
prices induce all maximum matchings.
1 Introduction
e weighted bipartite matching problem, or assignment problem, is a classical problem in graph
theory: how can we find a matching with the maximum total weight (maximum matching for
short) in a bipartite graph? ere is a direct connection between a maximum matching and a
socially optimal allocation of products to buyers in a matching market. In this market, there are
n buyers and n product. Each product can be allocated to at most one buyer, and each buyer
wants at most one product. Let V = (vij) ∈ R
n×n
+ be a matrix of valuations where buyer i thinks
product j is worth vij dollars. Clearly, valuations constitute a complete weighted bipartite graph
Gwith n le nodes representing buyers, n right nodes representing products, and n2 edges where
vij is the weight of edge (i, j). A valid allocation of products to buyers correspond to a matching
of G. e weight or social welfare of a matching is the sum of vij over the buyer-product pair
(i, j) in it. So, how can we find a matching that maximizes the social welfare?
∗Authors are listed alphabetically.
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Duality and mating market A standard approach to the maximum matching problem is the
duality of linear programming. Let xij ∈ {0, 1} denote whether i gets j. First write down our
goal in a linear program:
max
xij
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
vijxij ,
s.t.
n∑
j=1
xij = 1 (i = 1, ..., n),
n∑
i=1
xij = 1 (j = 1, ..., n),
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j
(or replace by xij ≥ 0, which does not affect the solution).
en derive its dual program:
min
ui,pj
n∑
i=1
ui +
n∑
j=1
pj ,
s.t. ui + pj ≥ vij , ∀i, j.
Many algorithms for the maximummatching problem, including the famous Hungarian algo-
rithm proposed in the seminal work [3] of Kuhn in 1955, are based on duality. ose algorithms
update the dual variables ui and pj dynamically to obtain a solution to the dual program which
can then be converted to a maximum matching in the original linear program.
Furthermore, there is a natural economic interpretation of the duality approach. Dual vari-
ables on the product side, pj , can be regarded as prices. If buyer i buys product j, she pays pj
and obtains a payoff of vij − pj . Dual variables on the buyer side, ui, then become the maximum
payoff buyer i can obtain by selecting her most favorable product. is connection between dual
variables and prices and payoffs has been discovered by Shapley and Shubik in 1971 [6] and some
following works, e.g., [5].
Market-clearing prices Although the duality approach and its economic interpretation are
standard, a beginner who is not familiar with linear programming still cannot understand those
complicated duality-based algorithms like Hungarian easily. Can we solve the maximum match-
ing problem with simpler techniques? Fortunately, an intuitive version of Hungarian algorithm
has been discussed in the textbook Networks, Crowds, and Markets by Easley and Kleinberg [2],
solely in the language of prices and payoffs, without mentioning dual variables at all. Once we
focus on prices and payoffs, the picture becomes vivid: e algorithm in [2] increases the price
of a product when too many buyers want it, so the payoffs of that product to buyers decrease
accordingly. Adding an edge to a matching corresponds to a buyer buying a product.
Moreover, when the above algorithm ends, the resulting prices obtain a nice property called
market-clearing (Definition 1). For such a price vector p = (p1, ..., pn), the market clears in the
sense that each buyer is able to buy her most favorable product (the product that maximizes
her payoff vij − pj), without conflicting with other buyers. us, a market-clearing price vector
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induces a socially optimal allocation of products to buyers, exactly maximizing the weight of
the matching (Property 1). In order words, finding a maximum matching in a weighted bipartite
graph boils down to finding a clearing price vector in a matching market.
e market-clearing price vector may not be unique. Actually, as argued in [6], the set of all
market-clearing price vectors is exactly the pj-part of the solution set to the dual linear program
mentioned above, and thus has some properties like convexity. What other properties do market-
clearing prices have? Can we show those properties without the help of duality?
Our results We ask two questions concerning market-clearing prices:
1. If there are multiple market-clearing price vectors, what properties does the set of market-
clearing price vectors have?
2. If there are multiple matchings with the maximum weight in a bipartite graph, can each
and every maximum matching be induced by some market-clearing price vector?
We give the following answers:
1. e set of market-clearing prices is closed under the operation of convex combination,
element-wise maximum, and element-wise minimum (eorem 1 in Section 3).
2. Yes. Any market-clearing price vector induces all maximummatchings in a bipartite graph
(eorem 2 in Section 4).
Our proofs are elementary and do not involve the duality of linear programming at all. In-
stead, our arguments rely on a key lemma (Lemma 1) which states that all market-clearing price
vectors induce a same set of maximum matchings. en our first theorem follows almost imme-
diately. e proof of our second theorem requires some additional knowledge of graph theory.
We believe that Lemma 1 is of independent interest. We also believe that our arguments can be
taught in related courses, or assigned as exercises, even at an undergraduate level, because of
their appropriate level of difficulty.
Related works Section 10 in [2] is an easy-to-read introduction to the bipartite matching prob-
lem. It provides a detailed description of how to update prices to satisfy the market-clearing
property. One can refer to [1] for the duality approach and many algorithms for the bipartite
matching problem. [4] provides a large list of variants of the assignment problem.
2 Preliminaries
A mating market ere are n buyers and n products. Each product j can be allocated (sold)
to at most one buyer, and each buyer i wants at most one product. Let V = (vij) ∈ R
n×n
+
be a matrix of valuations where buyer i values product j at vij ≥ 0. Valuations constitute a
complete weighted bipartite graph G which has n le nodes representing buyers, n right nodes
representing products, and n2 edges where the weight of edge (i, j) is vij . Let pj be the price of
product j. If a buyer i buys product j, she pays pj and obtains a payoff of vij − pj .
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Allocation and social welfare Clearly, a valid allocation of products to buyers correspond to
a matching M of G, which is a subset of edges that do not share any common node with each
other. Given a matchingM , we can define the social welfare SW(M) (or the weight ofM ) as the
sum of the valuations over all buyers for their received products,
SW(M) =
∑
(i,j)∈M
vij . (1)
Wewill focusmainly onmatchings thatmaximize the social welfare (maximummatchings). Since
we have assumed vij ≥ 0, it is never worse to choose a perfect matching, which means that the
size of matching |M | = n, i.e., each buyer buys some product (and all products are sold). So, we
assume that maximum matchings are always perfect.
Preferred-product graph Given a set of prices p = (p1, ..., pn), if buyer iwants to maximize her
payoff, she will buy a product j that maximizes vij−pj . Assume that she can choose any product
if there are multiple products with the maximum payoff. We can describe the set of products each
buyer is willing to buy by another bipartite graph, named preferred-product graph. Given a price
vector p = (p1, ..., pn), define the following sub-graph of G
G(p) :=
{
(i, j) ∈ G
∣∣∣∣vij − pj ≥ vik − pk, ∀k = 1, ..., n
}
(2)
as the preferred-product graph of p.
Preferred-product graphs have a useful property:
Fact 1. A perfect matching (a matching of size n) in the preferred-product G(p), if exists, is a
matching in G that maximizes the social welfare.
Proof. Let M∗ be a perfect matching in G(p). For any other matching M ′ in G, if M ′ is not
perfect, we complete it to be a perfect matchingM by allocating unsold products to unmatched
buyers arbitrarily. Note that SW(M ′) ≤ SW(W ) because vij ≥ 0. en:
SW(M∗)− SW(M) =
∑
(i,j∗i )∈M
∗
(vij∗i − pj∗i + pj∗i )−
∑
(i,ji)∈M
(viji − pji + pji)
=
n∑
i=1
pj∗i −
n∑
i=1
pji +
n∑
i=1
(
(vij∗i − pj∗i )− (viji − pji)
)
≥0 +
n∑
i=1
0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that each (i, j∗i ) is in G(p).
Definition 1 (Market-clearing prices). A price vector p = (p1, ..., pn) is market-clearing, if its
preferred-product graph G(p) contains a perfect matching.
For convenience, we say p induces a matching M if M is a perfect matching in G(p). For
a price vector p, let PM(p) denote the set of matchings induced by p. And we use M∗ =
argmaxM{SW(M)} to denote the set of all maximum (perfect) matchings inG. By Definition 1,
together with Fact 1, we immediately have:
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Property 1 (Market-clearing prices induce maximum matchings). For any market-clearing price
vector p,
∅ 6= PM(p) ⊆M∗. (3)
3 Space of Market-Clearing Prices
In this section we answer the first question: if there are multiple market-clearing price vectors,
what properties does the space of all such price vectors have?
eorem 1 (Closure of space). Suppose price vectors p and q are market-clearing. Let r ∈ Rn be
another price vector obtained by transforming p and q in the following four ways:
1. Diagonal shiing: r = p+(t, ..., t), for any t ∈ R. at is, moving p in the diagonal direction
1 = (1, ..., 1) forward or backward.
2. Convex combination: r = αp+ (1− α)q, for any α ∈ [0, 1].
3. Element-wise maximum: r = (r1, ..., rn) where ri = max{pi, qi} for each i = 1, ..., n.
4. Element-wise minimum: r = (r1, ..., rn) where ri = min{pi, qi} for each i = 1, ..., n.
en r is also market-clearing.
Now we prove eorem 1. e first item follows from the definition of preferred-product
graph G(p):
• Proof for diagonal shiing. Note that if all prices are increased or decreased by a same
amount t, the quantitative relation between the payoffs of any two products remains un-
changed for each buyer, so G(r) = G(p), and r is market-clearing as p is.
For the other three items, let S be the set of all market-clearing price vectors. e second
item in eorem 1 states that S is closed under convex combination. is property is also called
the convexity of S. For readers who are familiar with the duality approach, the convexity of S
may seem trivial: given that the space of market-clearing prices is exactly (a projection of) the
solution set of the dual program, S must be convex because the programming is linear.
However, the above argument cannot be easily generalized to prove that S is also closed
under element-wise maximum and minimum. In order to prove eorem 1 without duality, we
first prove the following key lemma which implies that all market-clearing price vectors induce
a same set of matchings.
Lemma 1 (Same set of induced matchings). For any two market-clearing price vectors p and q,
PM(p) = PM(q).
Proof. Recall thatPM(p),PM(q) are the sets of perfectmatchings in the preferred-product graphs
G(p), G(q).
Let M = {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), ..., (in, jn)} be a perfect matching in G(p), we will show that M
is also a perfect matching in G(q). To do this, we only need to prove that the all the edges
(i1, j1), ..., (in, jn) are in G(q).
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Prove by contradiction. Suppose that edge (i1, j1) is not inG(q). Since q is a market-clearing,
there exists a perfect matching N in G(q). Because (i1, j1) /∈ G(q), i1 must be matched to a
product other than j1 inN . Without loss of generality, assume i1 is matched to j2; then i2 cannot
be matched to j2, and we assume i2 is matched to j3; …; until some k ≤ n, where ik−1 is matched
to jk, and ik must be matched back to j1 in N . Now, (i1, j2), (i2, j3), ..., (ik, j1) ∈ N .
Consider (i1, j1) and (i1, j2). Because (i1, j1) is preferred in G(p), we have vi1,j1 − pj1 ≥
vi1,j2 − pj2 . Because (i1, j2) is preferred in G(q) and (i1, j1) is NOT preferred in G(q), we have:
vi1,j1 − qj1 < vi1,j2 − qj2 . Subtracting the two inequalities gives:
qj2 − qj1 < pj2 − pj1 .
Consider other edges: (i2, j2) is preferred inG(p)while (i2, j3) is preferred inG(q), we have:
qj3 − qj2 ≤ pj3 − pj2.
Similarly,
...
qj1 − qjk ≤ pj1 − pjk .
Summing up the above inequalities, we have 0 < 0, a contradiction.
us, M is a perfect matching in G(q). Symmetrically, each perfect matching in G(q) is a
perfect matching in G(p). us PM(p) = PM(q).
Remark. Lemma 1 is quite interesting in itself. It implies that any two preferred-product graphs, as
long as they have at least one perfect matching respectively, must share the same set of all perfect
matchings, even though the two graphs can be different.
Now we are ready to prove that the space S = {p ∈ Rn | p is market-clearing} is closed
under all transformations besides diagonal shiing.
• Convex combination. For any p, q ∈ S, α ∈ [0, 1], let r = αp + (1− α)q. By Lemma 1, p
and q induce at least one common perfect matching, denoted by N . Suppose i is matched
to j in N , then for any k = 1, ..., n, we have:
vij − pj ≥ vik − pk and vij − qj ≥ vik − qk.
Multiply by α and 1− α,
αvij − αpj ≥ αvik − αpk and (1− α)vij − (1− α)qj ≥ (1− α)vik − (1− α)qk. (4)
Summing the two inequalities in (4), we get
vij − rj ≥ vik − rk.
us, (i, j) is in G(r), for any (i, j) ∈ N . As a result, N is in G(r), so r ∈ S.
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• Element-wise maximum. For any p, q ∈ S, let r = (r1, ..., rn) where ri = max{pi, qi}. By
Lemma 1, p and q induce at least one common perfect matching, denoted by N . Suppose i
is matched to j in N , then for any k = 1, ..., n, we have:
vij − pj ≥ vik − pk and vij − qj ≥ vik − qk.
erefore:
vij − rj = min
{
vij − pj
vij − qj
}
≥ min
{
vik − pk
vik − qk
}
= vik − rk.
us, (i, j) is in G(r), for any (i, j) ∈ N . As a result, N is in G(r), so r ∈ S.
• Element-wise minimum. is can be proved by switching “max” and “min” in the above
argument for element-wise maximum. Here we present an alternative proof which uses the
closure property under diagonal shiing and convex combination. Consider the intersec-
tionx between the diagonal line passing r, {r+t1 | t ∈ R}, and line pq = {αp+(1−α)q |
α ∈ R}. One can easily verify that x lies between p and q, i.e., α ∈ [0, 1], thus x is
market-clearing. en r must be market-clearing because it can be obtained by shiing x
diagonally.
4 Any Market-Clearing Prices Induce All Maximum Matings
In this section we answer the second question: if there are multiple matchings with the maximum
weight in a bipartite graph, can each and every maximummatching be induced by some market-
clearing price vector?
Mathematically, we ask: whether for any M ∈ M∗, there exists p ∈ Rn, such that M ∈
PM(p)? Clearly, this question is in the opposite direction of Property 1 (PM(p) ⊆ M∗) which
says that the matching induced by market-clearing prices must be a maximum matching. Our
eorem 2 gives a positive answer, and even a stronger answer, saying that an arbitrary market-
clearing price vector satisfies our purpose of finding all maximum matchings.
eorem 2 (One versus all). For any market-clearing price vector p,
∅ 6= PM(p) =M∗. (5)
In the rest of this section we prove eorem 2.
Note that given Lemma 1 (saying PM(p) = PM(q) for any market-clearing p, q), all we need
to do is to find one specific market-clearing price vector p such thatM ∈ PM(p) for any given
M ∈ M∗. For convenience, we re-label the nodes inM such that (1, 1), (2, 2), ..., (n, n) ∈M .
We need to solve the the following system of difference constraints:
find (p1, ..., pi, ..., pn)
s.t. v11 − p1 ≥ v1j − pj , ∀j = 1, ..., n,
...
vii − pi ≥ vij − pj , ∀j = 1, ..., n,
...
vnn − pn ≥ vnj − pj , ∀j = 1, ..., n.
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Equivalently,
find (p1, ..., pi, ..., pn)
s.t. p1 ≤ pj + v11 − v1j , ∀j = 1, ..., n,
...
pi ≤ pj + vii − vij , ∀j = 1, ..., n,
...
pn ≤ pj + vnn − vnj , ∀j = 1, ..., n.
is is a classic problem and can be solved via shortest paths. Consider a directed graph with
n + 1 nodes 0, 1, ..., n. e source node 0 has an directed edge (0, i) with length 0 to each node
i. Add an edge from j to i with length vii − vij , for all i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., n.
Nowwe compute the lengthL(i) of the shortest path from 0 to each node i. We allow a path to
go through an edgemultiple times. So, if there is a cycle with negative total length in this directed
graph, then there must be some L(i) that can be −∞ because we can follow that negative cycle
infinite times. On the contrary, if there is no such negative cycle, all L(i), i = 1, ..., n must be
finite, and satisfy all the constraints L(i) ≤ L(j) + vii − vij because there is an edge from j to i
with length vii − vij . Seing p = (L(1), ..., L(n)) gives an solution.
So, it remains to prove that in the directed graph constructed above, there is no negative
cycle. Suppose on the contrary, there is an cycle (j1 → j2 → . . .→ jm → j1) with negative total
length:
(vj2j2 − vj2j1) + (vj3j3 − vj3j2) + ... + (vjmjm − vjmjm−1) + (vj1j1 − vj1jm) < 0.
Rearranging, we get:
(vj1j1 + vj2j2 + ...+ vjmjm) < (vj2j1 + ... + vjmjm−1 + vj1jm).
us, if we replace the sub-matching (j1, j1), (j2, j2), ..., (jm, jm) inM by the sub-matching
(j2, j1), ..., (jm, jm−1), (j1, jm),
then the social welfare of M is strictly increased, contradicting the assumption that M ∈ M∗.
is concludes the proof.
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